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to fundamental problems, nor is he altogether free from the objection that occasionally, for the sake of heightening the effect, he combats matters which by no means are universally regarded as part and parcel of present ethics. Even if entirely correct, the result reached by Simmel would not prove that the ethics of the future need to be treated in an entirely different spirit. And in this particular I do not at all agree with him. There is no doubt that morality and moral judgments existed long before there was a science of ethics, just as correct thinking is older than logic, and artistic form than æsthetic criticism. It is equally certain that the primary object of these three standard sciences is descriptive and analytical, with a view of determining the actual processes by means of which those judgments and psychological actions are brought about which we call logical thought, good character, and the power of æsthetic construction. But with this the end is not reached. Practical application in these fields also expects aid from scientific perception, just as the natural instinct looks for advancement and clearness, and the ideal standards for critical investigation and further development. Direct practice and reflection must complement each other, and always have done so. We must not force out ethics from the science of ethics, for what then remains may be called psychology, ethnology, history of civilization and morals, but ethics will have disappeared.

PRAGUE.

FR. JODL.

SOCIAL ETHICS: OUTLINES OF A DOCTRINE OF MORALS. By Theobald Ziegler, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Strasburg. Translated from the German. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892.

This little book is a praiseworthy effort of a kind which one can but wish competent thinkers felt themselves more frequently called upon to make. It is an endeavor to give the simplest, most popular expression possible to the best ethical thought of the day, as that appears to the writer. Professor Ziegler seems to think, and many of us will agree with him, that there is especial need at this time for such exposition. "Is the contradiction," he asks, "altogether harmless which we so often find between what we have been taught from childhood about moral questions and duties, and what we practise in daily life, or see our neighbors practise?" The book consists of a number of lectures "delivered to a general audience of cultured men and women" (from whom, however, no special culture in ethics is expected) with the aim of helping them to understand those difficulties which beset the thinking and even the action of many to-day in moral matters. "There arises," says Professor Ziegler, "an antithesis which we may briefly describe as the antithesis between authority and freedom, between conservatism and progress. This antithesis is at least related to, if it is not identical with, that between society and the individual, between conventional morality and conscience." An interesting sketch is given of the rise and history of the science of ethics, beginning, of course, with Socrates, and ending, strange to say, with English evolutionary utilitarianism.

In this latter selection as the point of view most important and characteristic in modern ethics, we have the key to all that follows. "The Origin of Morals," "The Nature of Morals," "Duty and Virtue," and "The Supreme Good," are all treated on lines with which the student of Mr. Herbert Spencer is familiar.

Professor Ziegler uses the terms "happiness" and "welfare" as interchangeable, giving at one time "the greatest happiness principle," and at another "the greatest possible welfare of the greatest possible number," as the standard and end. It is throughout apparent—as the above definition of "the good" would imply—that for Professor Ziegler society is an "aggregate of individuals." It is therefore somewhat startling to find him announcing, "there is for the individual no *summum bonum*, no supreme good." One wonders how, where, or in what it is to be realized! The radical defect, indeed, of our English utilitarian writers seems to attach to Professor Ziegler's thought. In spite of his German birth, in spite of at least some acquaintanceship with Kant and Hegel, in spite of denouncing the "narrow individualism" of Hobbes, Professor Ziegler remains first and last individualist. He never really transcends the antithesis he sets himself to explain. He speaks on almost the last page of his book of "that inward self-contradiction which we have already recognized in the idea of the Supreme Good,—it is that continual opposition between the individual and the whole, between morality and happiness,—an opposition which no *Deus ex machinâ*, no hereafter, has the power ever to reconcile or banish from the world."

His psychology has everywhere the same defect. "Man is an egotist by nature;" "I must first myself become a personality in order to be able to do something for others;" "Duty and virtue are peculiarly ideas of an individualistic ethic."

In spite of these serious defects, the book is characterized throughout by a social enthusiasm, and by the habit of taking in all matters of practice the social point of view. But to praise it in this respect is to reduce it to the position of a hand-book of morals, whereas it aims at being a hand-book of the science of ethics. The book contains much that is admirable, but nowhere the *rationale* of its most admirable conclusions.

M. S. GILLILAND.

SOCIAL STATICS, abridged and revised; together with THE MAN *versus* THE STATE. By Herbert Spencer. Fourth thousand and twelfth thousand respectively. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892.

This volume, together with the recently published treatise on "Justice," and the "Plea for Liberty," edited by Mr. Mackay, may fairly be regarded as containing the complete gospel of individualism as conceived by the Spencerian school. The articles of this gospel are so well known and have been so freely discussed that it would be out of place to attempt any criticism of them here. To bestow praise on a writer of Mr. Spencer's world-wide renown would be still more impertinent. It must suffice to indicate what are the main points in which the present combined edition differs from preceding ones.

In the case of "The Man *versus* the State," there is scarcely any alteration. The only important change is to be found in the essay on *The Sins of Legislators*, in which a note is added (p. 341) illustrating from the recent municipal history of Glasgow the terrible disasters that result from "socialistic meddling."

"Social Statics," on the other hand, is reduced to about half its former size. This condensation is effected partly by the omission of diffuse illustrations and truistic propositions. Thus, no reader is likely to regret the disappearance of